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ESSAY
"PARENTAL" RIGHTS
Emily Buss*

T

here is growing concern among courts, commentators, and the
public that the law gives inadequate protection to the relationships that develop between children and "nontraditional" caregivers. The concern is clearly appropriate: The law governing these
relationships is poorly developed, and children's emotional interest
in maintaining these relationships is often very high. But this concern is taking the law in a bad direction, a direction that threatens
to upset the balance between family and state that serves children
well.
More precisely, the efforts to protect nontraditional caregiving
relationships is producing two related mistakes: the first a mistake
of constitutional interpretation, the second a distortion of private
custody law. Courts and scholars make the first error when they
oppose the claims of nontraditional caregivers to those of parents
protected by the Constitution and therefore press for a diminution
of parental rights to make room for these other relationships. This
sort of error pervades the Supreme Court's analysis in Troxel v.
Granville,' the Court's most recent case considering the protection
afforded parents under the Due Process Clause. State legislatures
and domestic relations courts make the second error when they authorize the distribution of custodial fragments to individuals not
recognized as a child's parents. This second error is well illustrated
by the American Law Institute's newly adopted Family Dissolution

* Professor, University of Chicago Law School. My thanks to William Buss, Mary
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Rheinstein Research Fund in Family Law and the Stuart C. and JoAnn Nathan
Faculty Fund provided support for this research.
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Principles,2 as well as the recent explosion in legislation authorizing
third-party visitation orders
This Essay attacks both of these errors with a single argument. It
argues that the Constitution should be read to afford strong protection to parents' exercise of child-rearing authority but considerably
weaker protection to any individual's claim to parental identity.
This means that a state has broad authority to identify nontraditional caregivers as parents, and, if it does so, it must afford their
child-rearing decisions the same strong protection afforded more
traditional parental figures. It also means, however, that if a state
chooses not to recognize these nontraditional figures as parents,
the Constitution prevents the state from offering these figures
some more limited right of contact or custodial control.
While this argument draws heavily on the Supreme Court's parental rights doctrine, its ultimate aim is normative rather than
descriptive: What drives this constitutional interpretation is, at bottom, an assessment of its value to children. But the fact that the
Court's doctrine is in line with this argument is important for a
number of reasons. First, it counters common claims that the doctrine stands as an obstacle to the recognition of nontraditional
claims. Second, it makes sense of a doctrine that otherwise appears
fundamentally confused. And third, in doing so, it challenges the
common assumption that the Court's parental rights doctrine takes
inadequate account of children's interests.
Part I of this Essay will describe the emerging problem in the
law governing the allocation of parental authority, as revealed in
the Court's recent analysis, scholarly commentary, and state lawmaking. Part II will argue that children are well served by a system
that sharply limits a state's ability to interfere with a parent's childrearing decisions but that affords the state substantially more authority to assign parental identity where that identity is in dispute.
This allows the state to recognize nontraditional caregivers as parents in some circumstances, but it does not allow the state to
compel contact with these nontraditional caregivers where they are
not identified as parents. Part III will demonstrate that the Court's

2 Principles

of the Law of Family Dissolution (forthcoming 2002).

1The Court noted in Troxel that, at the time of its decision, all fifty states had
enacted some form of third-party visitation statute. 530 U.S. at 73 n.*.
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parental rights cases prior to Troxel support this approach. Part IV
will apply this analytic distinction to various claims brought by
nontraditional caregivers, drawing some conclusions about the nature of the protection the law should afford these claims.
I. PROBLEMATIC TRENDS IN THE LAW

The traditional conception of a family includes two parents, one
of each sex, and the group of biologically-related children under
their care. Many children are not, however, raised in such traditional homes. Children often are raised by single parents, by samesex couples, by extended family, or by unrelated caregivers.4 Moreover, advances in reproductive technology are producing an
expanding array of potential parental claimants, some linked to
their children by biology, others only by contract
A growing awareness of this variation in child-rearing structures
has called into question the ongoing relevance of traditional parental rights principles that were developed around the conventional
nuclear family model. In particular, lawmakers and scholars have
expressed increasing concern that this body of law inadequately
protects the important relationships children commonly develop
with adults other than their biological parents.' For many, these
4U.S. Census Bureau statistics report that the number of children raised in single parent
homes more than doubled to 25% from 1970 to 1990, and that children raised by nonparents have held steady for much of the century at approximately 4%. Among those
children not living with either parent in 1996, nearly half live with grandparents, 21% with
other relatives, and 22% with non-relatives including foster parents. See U.S. Census
Bureau, Population Division, Fertility &Family Statistics Branch, Living Arrangements of
Children, Tbls. 1 & 2, http'lwww.census.gov/populationwww/socdemo/childlla-child.html
(1996).
5In 1998, 28,500 births through Assisted Reproductive Technology ("ART") were
reported to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Approximately 3,500 of
these births involved donor eggs. Another 240 births through the use of surrogate or
gestational carriers were reported to the Centers that same year. See Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention et al., 1998 Assisted Reproductive Technology
Success Rates: National Summary and Fertility Clinic Reports, http://www.cdc.govl
nccdphp/drh/art98/PDF/art1998.pdf. The number of babies conceived with donor
sperm, not by itself reported as an ART procedure, has been estimated at 20,000 to
30,000 per year. Rita Rubin, Who's My Father?: Progeny Seek Some Conception of
Donors, USA Today, Nov. 2, 2000, available at 2000 WL 5794389.
Sperm
6
See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status:
The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has
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demographic trends justify a departure from the tradition of strong
parental deference and an expansion of the state's involvement in
the decisionmaking of the private family. Two examples, one
framed in constitutional terms and one focusing on state custody
law, reflect lawmakers' inclination to depart in these fairly radical
ways from our traditional approach to family law. This Essay reveals the problems associated with this departure and suggests an
alternative means of accommodating nontraditional relational
claims that preserves the benefits provided to children by the traditional allocation of authority between parent and state.
A. Troxel v. Granville
In 2000, the Supreme Court considered a constitutional challenge to Washington State's "third-party" or "non-parental"
visitation statute.7 At issue in the case was whether a state could
order visits with a non-parent against the wishes of a parent if the
state determined that such visits were in the child's best interests.
At the time the case was heard, all fifty states had enacted some
form of third-party visitation statute, many of them singling out
grandparents, others granting standing more broadly.8 Several advocacy organizations for grandparents and children filed amicus
briefs emphasizing the changing look of American families and the
importance of children's maintaining relationships with those nontraditional caregivers to whom they had formed attachments These
Failed, 70 Va. L. Rev. 879 (1984); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A
Child-Centered Perspective on Parents' Rights, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 1747 (1993)
(arguing that parental rights fail to take adequate account of children's need for
nurturance and care); cf. David D. Meyer, The Paradox of Family Privacy, 53 Vand.

L. Rev. 527, 586-87 (2000) (suggesting that state action aimed at facilitating ongoing
relationships with extended family members justifies greater intrusions in parental
decisionmaking).
7 Troxel, 530

U.S. at 57.

8 Id. at 73 n.*.
9 See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae National Association of Counsel for Children,

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (No. 99-138) (supporting state's authority to
order visits with third parties who had served in a parental role because of the
importance of these relationships to the child); Brief of Amicus Curiae Center for
Children's Policy Practice & Research, Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (No.

99-138) (cautioning the Court to avoid broad language suggesting that parents have a
constitutional right to exclude family members and other "informal kin" from contact
with a child that might disrupt the child's important relationships); Brief of Amicus
Curiae of Grandparents United For Children's Rights, Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S.
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sorts of arguments appear to have strongly impressed the Court,
inspiring a majority of the justices to offer only constrained support
for parental rights.
While a majority of the Court voted to strike down the challenged visitation order as a violation of the mother's constitutional
rights, the scope of the Court's ruling and an analysis of the various
opinions reveals a Court scrupulously avoiding any strong endorsement of parental rights." The four-Justice plurality limited its
holding to a determination that the statute was unconstitutional as
applied and seemed to signal its approval of several other states'
third-party visitation statutes through favorable citation." Announcing that the "demographic changes of the past century make
it difficult to speak of an average American family," Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor's plurality opinion noted that affording legal protection to a child's relationship with nontraditional caregivers
would come at a cost to the traditional parent-child relationship
protected by the Constitution. Viewing these claims in competition, the plurality tepidly concluded that the Due Process Clause
entitled parents' decisions about their children's
associations and
3
activities to "at least some special weight."'
Even this lukewarm endorsement of parental rights, however,
was too strong for Justices Anthony M. Kennedy and John Paul
Stevens, who each made clear that their interest in protecting nontraditional family relationships inspired their dissents. Justice
Kennedy's "principal concern" with the Court's holding was that it
"seem[ed] to proceed from the assumption that the parent or parents who resist visitation have always been the child's primary
caregivers and that the third parties who seek visitation have no legitimate and established relationship with the child."' 4 Justice
Stevens pointed to "[tihe almost infinite variety of family relationships that pervade our ever-changing society" to argue against an
interpretation of parental rights that would prevent courts from
57 (2000) (No. 99-138) (arguing that children have a constitutional right to maintain
their relationships with their grandparents).

10For a more detailed treatment of this interpretation, see Emily Buss, Adrift in the
Middle: Parental Rights After Troxel v. Granville,2000 Sup. Ct. Rev. 279.

1,Troxel, 530 U.S. at 71-72.
12Id. at 63-64.
'3Id. at 70.
14Id. at 98.
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forcing unwilling parents to allow visits the court deemed were in
their children's best interests. 5
For a majority of the Court, the rise of the nontraditional family
counseled caution in their embrace of parental rights. Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Stevens's opinions all portrayed the
claims of nontraditional caregivers as opposed to those of parents
and suggested that protecting these relationships could only be accomplished at some cost to parental rights. But opposing these
alternative caregiving claims to the claims of parents trivializes the
most significant among these nontraditional claims even as it
threatens to do real harm to the parental rights doctrine. It blurs
rights of parental authority with rights of parental identity and elevates parental identity rights to a status neither required by the law
nor in keeping with children's best interests.
B. The ALI's Principlesof the Law of Family Dissolution
As Troxel was making its way through the courts, the American
Law Institute ("ALI") was drafting its Principles of the Law of
Family Dissolution. Of considerable concern to the drafters, as it
was to the Court, was the harm that can come to children when
former caregiving relationships with non-parents are severed after
separation or divorce. While acknowledging that parental deference helps to maximize parents' commitment to their child-rearing
responsibilities, the drafters warned that disregarding the interests
of other adults who have served as caregivers "ignores child-parent
relationships that may be fundamental to the child's sense of security and stability."'6 In the final version of the Principles, adopted in
May 2000, the ALI's endorsement of nontraditional custody claims
represents one of its most significant departures from standard
family law principles.
The problem with the ALI's approach, however, is that it encourages courts to draw additional claimants into the custodial
circle without taking adequate account of the potential harm to
children caused by this diffusion of parental authority. Under the
ALI Principles, the court can proliferate custodial fragments
15Id. at 90.
l6 Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution (Tentative Draft No. 3, Part I, 1998),
at 6 (Introductory Discussion) [hereinafter Principles, Draft No. 3].
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among individuals to whom the law assigns, at best, qualified parental identity and responsibility. This proliferation, in turn,
undermines the legal parents' ability to fulfill those weighty responsibilities associated with raising children.
More specifically, the ALI Principles call for three changes to
standard custody law that become problematic in combination.
First, two categories of individuals-"parents by estoppel" and "de
facto parents"-are added to the list of those afforded standing to
assert custodial claims and the right to notice where such custodial
claims are asserted by others.17 Second, categorical terms such as
"visitation" and "custody," and "physical custody" and "legal custody," are abandoned in favor of a noncategorical approach that
distributes portions of "custodial" and "decision-making" authority
among multiple claimants based on various considerations.18 Third,
the dominant factor to be applied in determining this allocation is
historical practice.19 In the average case, the past distribution of
caregiving and decisionmaking authority among custodial claimants is to determine the allocation prescribed in the custodial
decree. Together, these three provisions are intended to give courts
authority to design a custodial plan that protects a child's relationship with a broad range of former caregivers.
In the ALI's terminology, the traditional parental claimants
whose parental identity is clearly established by biology, adoption,
or, in some states, the operation of an irrebutable presumption, are
called "legal parents."'2 Individuals who have held themselves out
as parents, either because they believed they qualified as legal parents or because they agreed with legal parents to do so, are
"parents by estoppel," afforded the same rights of standing and notice in custodial proceedings as legal parents. "De facto parents,"
in contrast, are those who, while never holding themselves out as
parents, performed such a large portion of the caretaking function
(under circumstances other than the provision of babysitting or fos-

"1Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution § 2.03 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2000)
[hereinafter Principles, Draft No. 4].

"IId.88 2.09-2.10; see also Principles, Draft No. 3, supra note 16, at 8-9 (Introductory
Discussion).
19Principles, Draft No. 4, supra note 17, §§ 2.09-2.10.
20 Id. § 2.03(1)(a) cmt.
2 Id. §§ 2.03(1)(b), 2.04(1)(b).
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ter care services) that they are likely to have established a parentchild relationship of some significance with the children in question.' These de facto parents are afforded significant rights to
standing and notice under the Principles, but rights clearly subordinated to those of legal parents and parents by estoppel.'
The Principles' articulation of multiple parental categories suggests a hierarchy of rights among these categories both in and
outside the custody context. While the Principles only expressly assign subordinate rights to de facto parents, the distinction between
"legal parents" and "parents by estoppel" can be expected to have
significance in other contexts where parental rights are implicated.
Most significantly, the ALI gives no indication that the custody
proceeding can transform parents by estoppel into the sort of parents entitled to special constitutional protection under the Due
Process Clause, and it seems unlikely that the ALI would be calling
for such a proliferation of constitutionally protected parents without any acknowledgment of this significant change. Indeed, there is
little evidence that the ALI drafters gave any attention to the constitutional implications of their expansion of custodial claimants.
The second shift advocated by the ALI Principles is from rigid
categories of custodial offerings, classically the categories of "custody" and "visitation," to a full, graduated spectrum of custodial
and decisionmaking authority to be divvied up among claimants by
the court. While at some point along the spectrum the portion of
custodial authority might look much more like a classic visitation
award, the intent of the drafters was to get away from the "adversarial, win-lose nature of the process" associated with the sorting of
visitation and custody rights.24 They aimed to reconceive the allocation of custody as a "dynamic and complex process," distributing

Id. § 2.03(1)(c).
Id. § 2.03(1)(b) cmt. ("A parent by estoppel is afforded all of the privileges of a
legal parent under this Chapter, including ... priority over a de facto parent and a
non-parent in the allocation of primary custodial responsibility under § 2.21"); Id.
§ 2.21(1)(a) (stating the general rule that a court should not allocate "the majority of

custodial responsibility to a de facto parent over the objection of a legal parent or a
parent by estoppel who is fit and willing to assume the majority of custodial
responsibility," and setting out limited circumstances justifying a departure from this
rule).

Principles, Draft No. 3, supra note 16, at 9 (Introductory Discussion).

24
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"custodial responsibility" and "decision-making responsibility" in a
wide array of different forms.'
The third shift endorsed by the ALI is the reliance on the historical distribution of caregiving and decisionmaking responsibility
to determine how custodial responsibilities should be allocated between separating parents. This historical focus also reflects a kind
of deference to private decisionmaking, suggesting that the terms
the interested parties agreed upon, before they were in conflict, tell
the court a great deal about these parties' assessment of what division can most workably serve their child's best interests even after
conflicts arise.26 Read together, these three changes endorse an expansion in the number and nature of custodial claims asserted, as
well as the number and nature of custodial dispositions available to
the courts.
These three aspects of the Principles are all clearly driven by the
ALI's attempt to embrace developments in custody law that will
better serve children's interests than the traditional approach. In
particular, the Principles are designed to preserve important and
successful child-rearing relationships at the time of family fragmentation. But as with the Court's analysis in Troxel, the drafters of the
Principles are attempting to achieve good ends through bad means.
Indeed, the weakness of the ALI Principles complements the constitutional error of the Court. Where the Court squarely addressed
the constraints imposed by the Constitution on the visitation claims
of non-parents and suggested that these constraints are relatively
weak, the ALI proposes a custodial scheme that assumes the
weakness of those constitutional constraints.
The ALI's custodial scheme-including the proliferation of
quasi-parental claimants, the disaggregation of custodial authority,
and the reliance on past practice to set the future custodial allocation-is problematic in several interrelated respects. First, while
the ALI concedes that increasing the number of those with custodial involvement can produce conflict and coordination problems

Id. (Introductory Discussion).

Id. at 11 (Introductory Discussion) ("[W]hen parents do not agree [on how to
allocate decisionmaking at the time of separation], past divisions of responsibility may
be the most reliable proxy for the shares of responsibility they would agree upon if
they were focused on their child.").
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that adversely affect children,27 it fails to acknowledge the particular problems produced when the additional custodial figures are
kept in a subconstitutional status. We can expect special problems
to arise for two distinct reasons. First, in affording these claimants
authority to assert custodial claims while defining them outside the
class of parents entitled to constitutional protection against intervention from the state, the scheme limits these claimants' ability to
exercise their portion of custodial responsibility effectively. Second, by offering the state authority to distribute portions of
custodial authority without taking the bigger step of recognizing
these custodians as full, constitutionally protected parents, the ALI
fails to impose any discipline on the state's distribution of custodial
involvement. Confining the distribution of custodial authority to
those on whom the state is willing to confer full parental status ensures that the state will exercise considerable caution in expanding
the number of custodial figures in a child's life.
These problems of custodial proliferation will only be exacerbated by the ALI's second proposal: the abandonment of the
traditional categories of custody and visitation. As intrusive as visits can be for parents exercising primary authority over children,
the impact of contacts framed as "visits" is significantly circumscribed by this framing. Visits take time and scheduling control
away from children's primary parental figures. They also expose
children to other adults who will exercise at least some physical
and emotional control over them, and who may try to maximize
their influence in a way that undermines the primary caregivers'
control.' But if these attempts are found objectionable, the fact
that an individual "only has visitation rights" will give the primary
caregiver considerable leverage to control the objectionable conduct in and out of court.
The ALI's abandonment of the custody/visitation dichotomy and
the system of "winners and losers" it produces has the effect, apparently deliberate, of blurring the lines of custodial authority
among the various custodial claimants. In lieu of a system of custo27

Principles, Draft No. 4, supra note 17, § 2.21(1)(b) (directing a court to limit or

deny an allocation of custodial responsibility to a non-parent that would otherwise be

appropriate "if, in light of the number of other adults to be allocated responsibility,
the allocation would be impractical in light of the objectives of this Chapter.").
13This problem is discussed at somewhat greater length in Buss, supra note 10.
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dial allocation that establishes a pecking order among custodial authorities, the ALI encourages courts to customize custodial
packages to suit the circumstances of each individual case. While
this aspect of the Principles seems designed with the two-parent
model in mind, it also applies to the expanded range of custodial
claimants the Principles invite. The ease with which courts can expand the list of individuals with custodial authority, and the
flexibility with which custodial responsibilities can be divided
among these individuals, threatens the ability of any individual to
perform those responsibilities effectively for the child.
The third distinctive aspect of the ALI's custody principles,
namely the reliance on past practice to determine future custody
allocation, fails to account for the difference between those arrangements worked out cooperatively, when custodial authority is
not an issue, and those arrangements that are compelled by a court,
when that authority is contested. This objection has considerable
force even in the context of simple disputes between a divorcing
couple. But what is difficult to manage, at two, is likely to become
even more so as the numbers increase. The problems created by
recognizing multiple caregivers might well prevent a court from
ordering such a custodial division, but the presumption favoring
preservation of whatever shared caregiving arrangements were
worked out in a spirit of cooperation will press in a direction that
may well be harmful to children once that spirit disappears.
At least as significant, the assignment of custodial authority to
these other caregivers will often come as a surprise to the legal
parents. People have a general understanding that both legal parents will have custodial rights should they separate, but many will
not realize that agreeing to a cooperative caregiving arrangement
with others may have the effect of bestowing custodial rights on
those cooperators. And while the problem of surprise could be
dismissed as a temporary problem that will be solved as people begin to learn about these new rules of custodial allocation, the
problem created by this learning is likely to be at least as harmful
for children. A fear that involving additional caregivers could give
those caregivers authority to seek custodial rights in court will
surely inspire some parents to avoid involvement they would otherwise consider beneficial to their children. Part IV argues that
caregivers should be allowed to assert a claim for full parental
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rights, based on an established relationship with a child. But that
argument is premised on the assumption that the significance of allocating full parental status to a new individual will deter many
caregivers from asserting the claim, and most courts from granting
it. The problem with the ALI's proposal is that it gives courts authority to allocate fragments of custodial authority, fragments that
caregivers will likely want, and that courts will too readily give.
Ultimately, then, the problem with the ALI Principles is not that
they recognize additional non-biological parental claimants to
child-rearing authority, but that they do so in a context that encourages the fragmentation of parental authority. Because custody
courts are routinely in the business of dividing up the custodial
package between parental claimants, adding claimants to their list
offers a deceptively easy way to afford additional adult-child relationships some degree of protection. It is this diffusion of custodial
authority disconnected from the disciplining constraint that comes
with the recognition of parental rights that will create problems for
children.
The Court's analysis in Troxel and the ALI's custody principles
suffer from similar failings: They both classify nontraditional caregivers as distinct from constitutionally protected parents and then
endorse these non-parents' custodial access to children. This approach gives the nontraditional caregivers both too little and too
much. It screens them out of the full parental status to which they
are sometimes entitled, and it affords them authority, independent
of that status, that will interfere with others' effective exercise of
their parental duties.
Children will be better served by a constitutional approach that
affords states considerable control over the assignment of parental
identity but that prevents states from requiring contact between
children and non-parents, if such contact is opposed by their parents. After discussing the benefits to children of distinguishing
between parental rights of authority and identity in this way, this
Essay demonstrates that this approach is entirely consistent withindeed, best accounts for-the Court's parental rights decisions
prior to Troxel.
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II. CONCEIVING PARENTAL RIGHTS IN CHILD-SERVING TERMS

A. Rights of Child-RearingAuthority
A primary premise of this Essay is that a legal system that shows
strong deference to parents' child-rearing decisions serves children
well.' Parents' strong emotional attachment to their children and
considerable knowledge of their particular needs make parents the
child-specific experts most qualified to assess and pursue their children's best interests in most circumstances. In contrast, the state's
knowledge of and commitment to any particular child is relatively
thin. A scheme of strong constitutional rights shields the parent
expert from the intrusive second-guessing of the less expert state.
This is not to say that the law's deference to parental control
should be absolute. State interests, whether focused on the child in
question or on other societal concerns, will sometimes be great
enough to justify interference with parental control.' In assessing
whether other societal interests are sufficiently compelling to justify interference with parental control, the relative child-rearing
expertise of parent and state is beside the point. But where, as in
our context, state intervention aims to serve the interests of the
very child whose parents oppose intervention, the relative competence of parent and state should be our central concern.
The state can legitimately claim at least two sorts of childrearing expertise superior to that of individual parents. First, the
state has the advantage in overseeing what we might call the child's
"public development." Because the state is the relative expert on
its own design and function, it is in a better position than a parent
to judge what education and experiences are most likely to prepare
a child for participation in the state's economy and government. At
least where parents share the ultimate aim of public participation,

29This position has been expounded in greater detail elsewhere. See, e.g., Buss,
supra note 10, at 287-98; Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist

Manifesto, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 937 (1996); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott,
Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 Va. L. Rev. 2401 (1995).
These two sorts of state interests justify state intervention in the name of parens
patriae power and police power, respectively.
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the state's expertise in public development offers special justification for state intrusions designed to achieve this aim.31
Second, the democratic process makes the state the relative expert in identifying community consensus about the appropriateness
of particular child-rearing practices, including practices that have
only private developmental effects. But this consensus can, at best,
justify state intervention where it condemns or applauds certain
child-rearing choices in all circumstances. The best example of such
categorical condemnation is the state's prohibition of child abuse
and neglect.' Once the state is called upon to make individualized
judgments about whether a particular choice is appropriate for a
particular child, we should have no confidence that the state can do
a better job than the parent in choosing the course of private development for that child.
But even where the state's relative child-rearing expertise is
greatest-where the developmental stakes are most public, or
where the consensus is most unqualified-we should be slow to allow state intervention if the child's welfare is our goal. This is
because the state will have to rely on the parents to implement, or
at least facilitate, its unwelcome interventions. For the best parents, this unwelcome obligation will have a certain undermining
effect. By definition, it will force them to act, or encourage their
children to act, in a manner that they believe disserves their children's interests. We can, however, also count on the best parents to
take pains to fulfill whatever obligations the state imposes in a
manner that is healthiest for their children.
But not all parents are this competent and self-sacrificing. Indeed, it is precisely those parents whose decisionmaking most
inspires state intervention who are likely to do the most damage
when forced to do what they do not want to do. The undermining
effect of unwelcome obligations is likely to be particularly strong
31

It is a separate and important question whether parents can decide, on behalf of
their children, to prevent precisely this development into economically and politically

participating citizens. This question, which is beyond the scope of this paper, is a
central question raised by Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233-34 (1972), discussed

briefly in Section III.A.
3 Of course, even categorical prohibitions must be applied to specific facts, and this
involves the courts in difficult, case-specific assessments of whether abuse or neglect

in fact has occurred. But the justification for this intrusive intervention is the
condemnation of abuse and neglect in all circumstances.
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for parents struggling to meet their parental responsibilities. And
parents whose child-rearing choices are skewed by selfishness or
immaturity will bring that same selfishness and immaturity to their
implementation of those obligations. In short, even good state decisions about child-rearing practices are likely to produce bad
results when the state relies on resistant parents to carry them out,
and the self-interested or overstressed parent can be expected to
do a particularly bad job of coping with these intrusions.
Because state intervention in child rearing inevitably comes at a
cost, it should be limited to those circumstances where the costs of
failing to intervene are great enough to justify the costs of intervention. State intervention, therefore, should be limited to those
circumstances in which the state deems intervention necessary to
protect a child from harm and, again, only from harm the state has
some special expertise to assess. In the public realm, for example,
the state has special expertise to assess risks associated with certain
educational decisions. In the private realm, the state's expertise allows it to prohibit child abuse and neglect as a child-generic harm
condemned by the community.
But where the choices to be made concern a child's intimate associations as they do in our context, both the private and childspecific nature of the inquiry make the state a particularly illqualified decisionmaker 3 Because the parent knows herself, her
child, and her entire household better than the state knows them,
and stands in a position of greater influence than the state over the
behavior of all three, the parent is best situated to decide what private relationships should be fostered.' Under a competence-based
regime of parental rights, protection against state intervention to
compel the child's contact with non-parents should be especially
strong.

3 While the courts' and legislatures' recognition of an expanded list of custodial
claimants may reflect society's general views about the value to children of maintaining

relationships with grandparents and long-term caregivers in some circumstances, none
of these legal developments call for court-ordered visitation or other custodial
involvement for all those who lawfully request it.
3 The state has a considerably stronger interest (and, relatedly, expertise) in
associational decisions aimed at serving children's public development as citizens. See
Emily Buss, The Adolescent's Stake in the Allocation of Educational Control Between
Parent and State, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1233 (2000).
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The legal scheme best designed to keep primary child-rearing
authority in the hands of parents is a scheme of strong constitutional rights. As a matter of definition, a scheme that affords
parents no constitutional protection shifts the ultimate allocation
of child-rearing authority to the state. Perhaps less obviously, a
scheme that affords parents a weaker or less crisply defined constitutional protection is likely to shift that allocating authority as
well-this time to the courts interpreting the murky constitutional
protection.' In contrast to both, a strongly protective constitutional
right reduces the role of the courts to enforcer of the strong protection, a reader of the scales tipped heavily in the parent's favor.
Stated another way, a move to weaken the protection afforded
parents under the Constitution is at least as threatening to parental
autonomy as a move to eliminate the protection. Both moves
threaten to shift decisionmaking to a state actor with considerably
less child-specific competence than a parent and with the power to
cause harm through the process and outcomes of its decisionmaking.
B. Rights of ParentalIdentity
The argument for strong parental deference assumes, however,
that parental identity is clear. In most cases, parental identity,
whether established through traditional sexual reproduction, assisted reproductive technology, adoption, or other means, is, in
fact, uncontested. But where one individual disputes the parental
identity of another, this dispute will dramatically undermine the
ability of either competitor to exercise the authority that justifies
such deference. The most compelling claims of "nontraditional
families" are those that contest a biological parent's claim to parental identity. Where such contests occur, the state facilitates
rather than undermines the exercise of parental authority by stepping in to resolve the dispute.
In analyzing identity rights, as in the previous analysis of authority rights, this Essay aims for a legal scheme that serves children's
interests. Thus, authority to assign parental identity, like authority
to control child rearing, should be allocated in a manner that ex35

The Court in Troxel appears to be headed in this direction. Buss, supra note 10, at

283-84.
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ploits the relative expertise of private parties and the state and
minimizes the harms associated with state intervention. These
same considerations, however, justify considerably greater state intervention in the assignment of parental identity than can be
justified in the child-rearing choices of identified parents.
Where there is no dispute among private individuals about who
counts as a parent, deferring to this process of self-identification
comports with our child-focused conception of parental rights. The
individual's self-identification reveals her willingness (frequently
even eagerness) to undertake parental responsibilities, and her
growing knowledge and attachment nurtured through day-to-day
parental interaction fosters her relative expertise. In contrast, the
state has no special commitment to or expertise about the child
that would allow it better to assess the quality of the parenting
provided, let alone to compare it to the potential parental quality
of others. Moreover, removing a child from a clearly identified
family unit will predictably impose a double harm: It will create
family conflict by introducing a family competitor, and it will deprive the child of the value of the original parents' accumulated
child-specific expertise. In the absence of competitors, then, individual choices about parental identity can be conceived as an
aspect of their exercise of parental authority, entitled to strong
constitutional protection from state interference.
If parental identity is used to mark those entitled to deference in
their exercise of child-rearing authority, then it belongs with whomever has undertaken parental responsibilities and thereby
established her expertise. Assigning parental rights to those closest
to the child's familial core will ensure that those bearing responsibility for the child's upbringing will have the authority to carry out
that responsibility. This suggests that parental identity derives not
from any set of individual characteristics, but rather from the parent-child relationship itself and, more particularly, the centrality of
the relationship in the child's life.
We should, then, avoid assigning distinct constitutional identity
rights to any set of individuals based on their particular characteristics. Rather, we should conceive of identity rights as a form of
familial right, the right of the family to control its child-rearing
structure free from state interference. This is not to suggest that a
parental right of identity is not an individual right, but rather that
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the assignment of that right derives from family status. This also
suggests that the authority of private individuals to self-identify as
parents depends upon the clarity of their familial claim. Where familial relationships do not offer clear answers to the question of
parental identity, deferring to private arrangements may prevent
any individuals from exercising child-rearing authority effectively.
In such circumstances, the state facilitates rather than compromises
parental authority by resolving the disputes that stand in the way.
As with parental authority rights, we can justify state intervention in the assignment of parental identity where the state brings
some superior competence to the decisionmaking process. Here,
the state can claim three sorts of special competence that pertain to
identity choices. First, it can claim the same expertise about community attitudes toward parenting practices that was discussed in
the authority context. Whereas, in that context, the expertise justified prohibiting practices (such as abuse and neglect) viewed as
inappropriate in all circumstances, in this context, the expertise justifies the state in depriving parents who nevertheless engage in
such practices of their parental identity. Second, the state can claim
special competence to establish default rules of parental identity
around which private parties can bargain. Third, the state can claim
special competence as the resolver of disputes over parental identity. These second and third forms of expertise bear most directly
on the state's authority to identify nontraditional caregivers as parents.
While the state cannot justify reassignment of parental identity
in the absence of conflict, it can help to avoid these conflicts by establishing identity default rules. Where a state announces
presumptive rules of parental identity and the process through
which an individual can defeat the presumption, it can help individuals clarify their identity claims from the outset. Requiring
parents to declare their parental identity when it might not be obvious establishes who bears parental responsibility and, therefore,
who qualifies for the high degree of deference championed above.
This requirement, in turn, should help individuals avoid future conflicts by forcing them, at or near the child's birth, to address
identity issues otherwise left ambiguous.
The state is uniquely qualified to establish these default rules for
two reasons. First, only the state can establish and publish a single

HeinOnline -- 88 Va. L. Rev. 652 2002

2002]

"Parental"Rights

653

set of rules binding on all residents. Second, as already discussed,
the state has superior expertise in assessing the community's categorical preferences among child-rearing arrangements. While this
general community expertise cannot displace the child-specific expertise that develops in the course of an actual parent-child
relationship, it can serve to justify the default rules from which parties can depart through some combination of bargaining and public
declaration.'
Finally, the state has special competence to resolve disputes
among individuals competing for parental identity. While we can
generally expect private individuals to make better judgments than
the state about how to raise their own children because of their
greater knowledge of, commitment to, and responsibility for those
children, this reasoning does not tell us how to distinguish among
various private competitors who all aim for this level of knowledge,
commitment, and responsibility. Moreover, until the conflict among
parental claimants is definitively resolved, all parental claimants
will be compromised in their ability to develop and exercise that
superior competence. In such cases, the state is uniquely qualified
to provide this needed resolution. This is not because the state has
any special expertise in choosing among parental claimants, but
rather because it is the only entity that can serve as the authoritative resolver of these disputes. Just as separating couples turn to
the state to work out shared child-rearing responsibilities better
left to private resolution were the family still intact, so the state offers a neutral, if decidedly inexpert, decisionmaker to sort among
competing parental claims where the circumstances of a child's
creation or upbringing raise questions about parental identity.
While consideration of relative competence justifies some qualification of parental rights in both the authority and identity contexts,
this consideration has very different implications for the claims of
nontraditional caregivers in these two contexts. As argued previously, the state has no comparative advantage over a parent in
assessing the value to a child of maintaining particular private relationships with non-parental figures. In contrast, the state is

Allowing states to play this role in assigning default rules governing parental identity

also allows for the kind of legal experimentation demanded by the increasing diversity
of familial arrangements and familial claims.

HeinOnline -- 88 Va. L. Rev. 653 2002

654

VirginiaLaw Review

[Vol. 88:635

uniquely qualified to prevent, or, when necessary, resolve parental
identity disputes between traditional and nontraditional parental
claimants.
A regime of parental rights designed to serve children's interests
would sensibly afford parents considerable deference in exercising
parental authority but would allow the state to intervene in ways
designed to avoid or resolve conflicting claims of parental identity.
Such a regime would allow the state to identify nontraditional
caregivers as additional or alternative parents, entitled to this
heightened deference. But where the state refused to identify a
nontraditional caregiver as a parent, it would have no authority to
compel contact between the caregiver and child. In such circumstances, parents and not the state would be left to decide this childspecific question affecting the child's private development. This
scheme well-describes the Supreme Court's parental rights doctrine set out in its cases prior to TroxeL It is to these cases that I
now turn.
III. PARENTAL RIGHTS UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE

While the Supreme Court cases addressing parental rights are
frequently analyzed as a single block,37 they are better understood
as two separate sets of cases that address the two distinct issues of
parental authority and identity. In the first set, the Court considered the extent to which a state could intervene in child-rearing
decisionmaking where a child's parental figures were clearly identified. In these core cases, the Court has interpreted the Constitution
to afford these parents strong protection against state interference
with their decisionmaking authority. In the second set, comprised
primarily of the "unwed father" cases, the Court considered the extent to which the state could choose among competing parental
claimants. In these cases, the Court interpreted the Constitution to
impose minimal constraints on a state's authority to assign parental
identity among disputing claimants. These two sets of cases reflect
the bifurcated approach to parental rights advocated in this Essay.
Read together, they support an approach to nontraditional paren-

3

1See, e.g., Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65-66 (citing broad array of cases for the general
proposition that the Constitution affords parents strong protection).
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tal claims that will serve children better than the sort of approach
embraced by Troxel and the ALL.
A. The Constitution'sStrong Protectionof ParentalRights of
Authority
The constitutional protection afforded parents' child-rearing authority under the Due Process Clause has proved remarkably
hardy. First recognized by the Supreme Court in the 1920s,' parental rights survived the collapse of the Lochner era doctrine that
produced them. Uncompromised by that collapse, the early parental rights cases served a foundational role in the Court's reconstruction
9
of substantive due process rights in their contemporary form.
Among the contemporary claims for protected liberty interests,
none has received more widespread and consistent endorsement
than a parent's "fundamental right" to control the upbringing of
her children.
Parental rights under the Constitution are clearer in concept
than in detail. Prior to Troxel, the Court had addressed the core
right in only four cases, none of which squarely considered its
scope. In the first two, Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of
Sisters," the Court's recognition of parental rights was incidental to
its consideration of the economic liberty claims of educators. In the
42 and Wisconsin v. Yoder,43 pasecond pair, Prince v. Massachusetts
rental rights claims were entangled with religious liberty claims,
and the Court did little to untangle the two claims with its analysis.
Despite the sparseness of the analysis and the imperfection of the
fit, the Court routinely cites to these cases to demonstrate its long
-1Pierce v. Soe'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (striking down a state law requiring

all students to attend public school); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (striking
down state law that prohibited the teaching of languages other than English to
students who had not yet completed the eighth grade).
39 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (citing Meyer and Pierce to support a

finding of a fundamental right to privacy that extends to protect a woman's right to
choose to undergo an abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965)
(relying on Meyer and Pierce to strike down Connecticut's law banning the use of

contraceptives as a violation of rights of marital privacy protected by the Constitution).
41262 U.S. 390.
41268 U.S. 510.

- 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
41406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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and consistent support for parental rights.4' The doctrine's survival
on this arguably shaky foundation is itself an odd testament to the
doctrine's strength.
While Meyer and Pierce say very little, they do capture the essential wisdom behind affording parents great deference in their
child-rearing choices. "The child," the Court declared in Pierce, "is
not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to
' This lanrecognize and prepare him for additional obligations."45
guage, repeatedly quoted in cases analyzing parental rights,
captures the basic rationale for a strongly deferential approach.
The law places primary responsibility for child rearing with parents-a responsibility that includes the intense day-to-day
involvement of nurturance and the long-term investment that instills values and fosters skills. Affording parents strong protection
from outside interference, Pierce suggests, is the best means of ensuring the effective satisfaction of these important responsibilities.
This is not to say that the primary focus of the Supreme Court's
parental rights analysis in the 1920s, or of the common law courts
before then, was on child well-being. Indeed, much of the history
suggests that the law focused heavily on the benefits to parents,
with little regard for the children they controlled. ' The cases do
suggest, however, that the law has long recognized the link between the interests of parent and child, and between parental rights
and the fulfillment of parental duties. Today, the proprietary conception of parental rights is roundly condemned.47 But the benefits
to children, first acknowledged when parental rights were conceived in proprietary terms, now stand as an independent justification
for continuing to afford parents a tremendous degree of control.

44See,

e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,720 (1997).
41268 U.S. at 535.
46See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierceand
the Child as Property, 33 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 995, 1112-13 (1992) (arguing that the
conception of parental rights enshrined in Meyer and Pierce "had a strong property
component").
47See, e.g., id.; Troxel, 530 U.S. at 88-89 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("At a minimum,
our prior cases recognizing that children are, generally speaking, constitutionally
protected actors require that this Court reject any suggestion that when it comes to
parental rights, children are so much chattel.").
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B. The Court's Weak Protection of ParentalRights of Identity
In the first set of parental rights cases, parental identity was not
at issue. Indeed, parental identity was assumed, even in the case of
Prince, where the individual asserting parental rights was actually
an aunt with custody of her niece.' Where the core cases focused
on issues of parental authority, the Court's next set of parental rights
cases addressed this issue of parental identity. These cases merit
closer attention, both because they have been misconstrued to
support a qualification of parental rights of authority to accommodate a non-parent's claims for contact, and because, properly
understood, they suggest the state has considerable power to recognize nontraditional caregivers as parents themselves.
In a string of five "unwed father" cases, biological fathers asserted the right to be legally identified as their children's fathers
and to be afforded the authority associated with that legal identity.49 These men asserted parental rights not, as in the core cases,
to prevent the state from interfering with the choices made by familial child rearers, but rather to prevent the state from depriving
them of the status and authority of parents altogether. Where these
biological fathers faced paternal competitors, however, the Court
refused to afford their identity claims any due process protection
and left the states with considerable latitude to assign parental
identity among competing claimants. Acknowledging the link between clarity in lines of parental authority and the successful
fulfillment of parental responsibilities, the Court suggested that such
a state definitional role may serve precisely those interests protected by the Due Process Clause.
While the only parental claims rejected by the Court in the unwed father cases were identity claims, these cases have been
misconstrued to support a diminution of parental authority, particularly authority over a child's associations. Justice Stevens, for
example, cited these cases in Troxel for the proposition that
"[d]espite this Court's repeated recognition of these significant parental liberty interests, these interests have never been seen to be
U.S. at 159.
4 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248
(1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246
(1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
43321
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without limits."5 He then went on to rely on these cases to support
his conclusion that the state could compel a child to visit with a
non-parent against the parent's wishes. But these cases neither
embrace the rights of non-parents nor call for any qualification of
parental rights to accommodate these non-parents' claims. Rather,
they simply recognize the state's legitimate role in resolving disputes among multiple parental contenders.
In the first of the unwed father cases, Stanley v. Illinois,5 the
Court struck down a law that treated the children born to an unmarried mother as orphans when their mother died, regardless of
whether their biological father had formed a parental relationship
with them. In this context, where the biological father had no parental competitors, the Court held that the state could not deny the
father's parental identity without some form of a hearing. 2 While
Stanley opened the door to a host of parental identity claims, the
case itself captures a mix of identity and authority issues. Because
Stanley was the only private parental claimant available, his was a
battle between the private family and the state for parental control.
As in the core cases discussed above, the Court rejected the state's
attempt to wrest control from the private family. In the four unwed
father cases that followed, however, the primary issue was the
state's authority to decide among private parental contenders. In
this context, the Court has tolerated considerable state intrusions,
noting that these intrusions are aimed at facilitating, rather than
disrupting, the functioning of a private familial unit.
In the next three cases, Quilloin v. Walcott,3 Caban v. Mohammed,' and Lehr v. Robertson,55 the Court appeared to be moving
purposefully toward a systematic account of parental identity
rights. In Quilloin, the Court upheld a law that deprived a biological father of authority, under certain circumstances, to block an
adoption. In particular, Mr. Quilloin sought to prevent his biological child's adoption by a man whose decade-long marriage to the
child's mother and assumption of child-rearing responsibilities es-

10
530 U.S. at 87 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

51405 U.S. 645.
52
Id. at 658.
53434 U.S. 246.
'4 441 U.S. 380.
55463 U.S. 248.
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tablished the strength of his own parental claim. While only Mr.
Quilloin pressed his claim under the Constitution, the Court clearly
saw the case as one in which the state was deciding between the
claims of two plausible, but incompatible, paternal claimants. Conceding that the "relationship between parent and child is
constitutionally protected,"56 the Court concluded that the state
could legitimately play a role in identifying the relevant relationship that would qualify for that protection. Indeed, the Court
suggested that the state's facilitation of the adoption had the effect
of giving "full recognition to a family unit already in existence. '
Notably, the Court in Quilloin did not justify the state law as a
permissible limitation on a constitutional fight. That is, it did not
recognize Mr. Quilloin's constitutional fights as a father, but then
conclude that those fights could nevertheless be infringed to serve
the state's important interest in maintaining family unity and stability. Indeed, it never suggested that Mr. Quilloin had any
constitutionally protected fight whatsoever. Quilloin, then, reflects
not a curtailment of parental rights, but rather a minimization of
the role of biology in assigning those fights. Lacking a right to parental identity, Mr. Quilloin had no constitutional basis on which to
contest the state's assignment of parental fights elsewhere. By assigning parental fights to the stepfather through adoption, the state
established to whom parental fights-including strong fights
against state interference in child rearing-belonged.
In the next case, Caban, the Court again considered a biological
father's challenge to a law limiting his ability to block his biological
children's adoption by another man. As in Quilloin, the biological
mother sought to have her children adopted by the man she had
married, but unlike Mr. Quilloin, Mr. Caban had assumed some responsibility and developed a relationship with his biological
children. Indeed, he too wished to have his children adopted by his
wife. Relying on the Equal Protection Clause rather than the Due
Process Clause, the Court struck down the law, concluding that, at
least where mothers and fathers were similarly situated, the Constitution required that they be afforded similar fights of parental
identity. While the state had considerable authority to choose
56Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255.
SId.
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among parental competitors, it could not, the Court held, make
those choices on the basis of gender alone. 8
In Lehr v. Robertson, the Court again allowed the state to confer
parental identity on an adoptive father, without regard to the biological father's objections. But while the Court's holding endorsed
the state's authority to decide among parental competitors, it suggested, in dicta, a significant limitation to that authority. "When an
unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by 'com[ing] forward to participate in the
rearing of his child,' his interest in personal contact with his child
acquires substantial protection under the Due Process Clause."' 9
While the Court clearly intended with this description to capture
less traditional arrangements that nevertheless fulfilled the parental role, the suggestion that parental identity rights could
automatically be derived from some combination of biology plus
relationship threatened to give these rights force independent of
their value to children.
The problem with the Lehr formula is the problem with any
formula that confers parental identity on an individual without regard to his parental competitors. While requiring some relationship
in addition to biological paternity will in many cases identify an individual who stands in an unambiguous parental relationship with a
child, it will also capture those whose relationships are less central,
in relative terms, to children. Where one relational claim may
compete with others, automatically conferring identity rights on
one subset of relational claimants is as destructive for children as
automatically conferring identity rights on the basis of biology
alone. In suggesting that biology plus some relationship might be
enough to confer parental identity, the Lehr Court failed to consider how assigning identity rights to one category of individuals
might interfere with other parental claimants' exercise of parental
authority.
This sort of conflict was squarely pressed by the facts of Michael
H. v. Gerald D.' In Michael H., a biological father challenged a
California law that gave him no legal authority to identify himself
sId. at 391.
59Lehr, 463

U.S. at 261 (quoting Caban,441 U.S. at 392) (citation omitted).

- 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
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as the father of a child born to a married couple, absent the cooperation of either the biological mother or her husband. In the
particular case, both the biological father and the presumed (marital) father had held themselves out as the child's father, developed
a parental relationship with her, and provided for her support. The
Court upheld the law, but the fragmentation of the opinions left
the doctrine somewhat confused. The case is worth considerable
attention, nevertheless, because it is here that the Court confronted
the state's ability to deny legal identity to an involved biological
parent.
In a plurality opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia concluded that biology plus a parental relationship was not sufficient to establish a
constitutionally protected liberty interest, at least where that claim
competed with the interests of the "unitary family" represented by
the marital unit. 1 Buried in Justice Scalia's lengthy discourse on
history and tradition are two valuable insights. The first insight, offered only tentatively, is that constitutional identity rights will vary
with context. The second insight, built more directly on the analysis
of the earlier unwed father cases, is that conferring identity rights
on one individual necessarily encumbers the exercise of parental
authority by another. Recognizing the danger of attaching constitutional rights of parental identity to any group of individuals in a
vacuum, Justice Scalia properly concluded that resolving disputes
among parental competitors was best left to the states.
Although Justice Scalia concluded that an unwed father had no
constitutionally protected claim to paternity where a child was
born into a marital family whose "marital parents" were committed
to raising the child, he noted that this same father's claim might be
protected if the "marital parents [did] not wish to raise [the child]
as their own."'62 This unorthodox, conditional conception of individual rights prompted harsh criticism from Justice William J.
Brennan, Jr.6' But conditioning parental identity rights in this way
is entirely consistent with the Court's precedents and describes a
61Id. at 123.

"Id. at 129 & n.7.
Id. at 146 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing Justice Scalia for "suggest[ing] that
if Carole or Gerald alone wished to raise Victoria, or if both were dead and the State
wished to raise her, Michael and Victoria might be found to have a liberty interest in
their relationship with each other.").
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scheme well suited to serve children's interests. Where private individuals establish a family unit uncontested by parental
competitors, the Court has made clear that the state must defer to
those choices, whether those choices pair children with an unmarried biological father, as in Stanley, an aunt, as in Prince, or a
grandmother and an uncle, as in the related case of Moore v. Cleveland' In contrast, where there is disagreement among private
individuals about who has authority over a child's upbringing, the
Court has allowed the state to resolve the conflict by assigning parental identity to one competitor over another.
Justice Scalia's refusal to afford Michael H.'s identity claim constitutional status was driven by his appreciation of the problems
created by proliferating parental figures. Noting that "to provide
protection to an adulterous natural father is to deny protection to a
' he left to the state the business of
marital father, and vice versa,"65
assigning parental identity. While he went too far (and beyond the
force of his own arguments) when he suggested that the state must
choose between paternal claimants,' he was right to recognize that
any expansion of the number of individuals identified as parents
would necessarily come at a cost.
Because Justice Scalia's opinion is most noted for its celebration
of history and tradition in defining substantive due process rights,
and because this emphasis suggests a potential hostility toward parental claims explicitly recognized as "nontraditional," it is worth
saying a word in criticism of this analysis and to note what little effect it had on Justice Scalia's ultimate conclusions. Awarding
parental identity rights on the basis of historical support suffers
from the same weakness as the other formulaic approaches that
Justice Scalia properly rejected. Any simple formula-whether
based on history, biology, or biology plus some relationship-that
purports to establish to whom parental rights belong will fail, in
some circumstances, to account for those who constitute a child's
familial core. A constitutional protection reduced to any such formula will therefore disserve the important child-rearing interests
the Constitution should be construed to protect. In the end, Justice
64 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
MichaelH., 491 U.S. at 130.
16Justice Scalia says this only indirectly, if forcefully, by asserting that "California
lav, like nature itself, makes no provision for dual fatherhood." Id. at 118.
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Scalia only relied on history to reject Michael H.'s claim and declined to base any positive conclusions about fights on that history.
While his interpretation of history pointed strongly in favor of affording protection to the marital unit,67 Justice Scalia properly left
the choice among parental competitors to the state.'
Neither of Justice Scalia's insights-his recognition that identity
fights might be conditioned on the lack of parental competitors, or
his appreciation of the threat posed to the exercise of parental authority by the proliferation of legal parents-illuminates the other
opinions in Michael H. Most notably, Justice Brennan's dissent attempted to avoid the problems created by recognizing categorical
identity rights by shifting his focus from substantive to procedural
due process issues. His use of procedural mechanisms to obscure
the significance of parental identity choices echoes the problematic
approach of Troxel and the ALI Principles and therefore merits
some attention here.
Justice Brennan suggested that he could avoid the problems created by parental competition by framing Michael H.'s rights in
largely procedural terms. is procedural analysis focused on Michael H.'s right to a hearing-the right to have the state consider
his particular claims for parental connection before he was cut out
67 Id. at 124 (concluding that it is "impossible" to find that the relationship between
an adulterous father and his child was "treated as a protected family unit under the
historic practices of our society," and that "quite to the contrary, our traditions have
protected the marital family ... against the sort of claim Michael asserts").
Id. at 130 ("Our disposition does not choose between these two 'freedoms' [the
freedoms to pursue fatherhood in the forms represented by Michael H. and Gerald
D.], but leaves that to the people of California."). States continue, in fact, to resolve
the question in different ways. Some follow the approach of California at the time of
Michael H., preventing putative fathers from asserting paternity claims absent the
cooperation of at least one member of the marital unit, see, e.g., J.K. v. R.S., 706 So.
2d 1262 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997) (holding that an alleged biological father did not count
as a parent for purposes of standing to bring an action for custody of a child born to a
married couple); S.B. v. D.H., 736 So. 2d 766 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (concluding
that a putative biological father could not maintain a paternity action concerning a
child conceived by a married woman over the objections of the married woman and
her husband); others give biological fathers a legal means to self-identify and, once
identified, to seek a parental relationship with a child, see, e.g., In re Paternity of
S.R.I., 602 N.E.2d 1014 (Ind. 1902) (interpreting the relevant statute to allow a
putative father to establish paternity without regard to the mother's marital status);
Witso v. Overby, 627 N.W.2d 63 (Minn. 2001) (finding that the alleged father of a
child born while the mother was married to another man could assert a paternity
claim).

HeinOnline -- 88 Va. L. Rev. 663 2002

664

VirginiaLaw Review

[Vol. 88:635

of his daughter's life. To the extent conflict among parental figures
made this contact destructive for his daughter, Justice Brennan suggested, the state could take the conflict into account in this more
individualized fashion.'
There are at least two significant problems, however, with relying on process to diffuse the conflicts created by recognizing
multiple parents. The first is that the process itself will undermine
the parental functioning of other parents. The second is that the
procedural analysis leads us right back to the substantive issues
that press the conflict.
In Justice Brennan's view, Michael H.'s procedural rights included the right to a hearing on whether he should be identified as
the father and, if so, whether he should have ongoing contact with
his child. While Justice Brennan suggested that the court could assess the harm caused to the child by parental conflict in the context
of this hearing,7' he failed to account for the harm to parental functioning imposed by the hearing itself. The very appearance of another
man in court seeking to be identified as "the" or even "a" father of
a child would have some undermining effect on the marital father's
parental authority, and the conduct of the hearing could be expected to exacerbate that effect considerably. The hearing would
subject the marital relationship and the relationships between the
child and the various parental contenders to judicial scrutiny and
require the marital unit to bear the emotional, temporal, and financial costs of defending their parental claim.
Moreover, Justice Brennan's procedural focus merely papered
over the substantive issues pressed by the case. Michael H. asserted
the right to be identified as the child's father and to have contact
with her as a result of that identity. The fact that these rights might
be curtailed or eliminated by procedural means makes the rights
themselves no less substantive. Indeed, the ease with which these
rights could be curtailed is directly tied to the nature of these substantive rights.

69Id. at 147 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (suggesting that fathers such as Michael H.
might be denied the parental relationship they seek, where a court found such relationships
against their children's best interests).
70Id. at 156 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Procedural due process analysis ties the extent of process required to the weight of the interest at stake,7 and the Court has
repeatedly stressed the special weightiness of a parent's interest in
a relationship with his child.' A hearing seeking to deprive a parent of this interest must afford that parent generous procedural
protections, protections that will increase the emotional and financial costs of litigation and, perhaps, make it especially difficult for
opponents to prevail.' Moreover, whatever hearing the Constitution affords the parent will tie decisionmaking to some substantive
standards. While Justice Brennan suggested that a state could apply a best interest standard not only to prohibit visits but also to
terminate parental rights,7' it is unclear why this low standard
would suffice, in light of the constitutional weightiness of a parent's
interest in the relationship. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly suggested that the Constitution may require a finding of unfitness
before an individual's parental rights can be terminated.75
As the next Section shows, some nontraditional claims will force
a consideration of these procedural questions. But recognizing parental rights and then providing a procedural means of curtailing
those rights clearly imposes real costs on other parental figures trying to raise children successfully. Children will be better off with a
legal scheme that allows states to limit the field of those identified

7'See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (explaining that the extent of
process due depends upon a balancing of three factors: the private interests affected
by the proceedings, the risk of error created by the State's chosen procedure, and the

countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure).
2 See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) ("This Court's

decisions have by now made plain beyond the need for multiple citation that a
parent's desire for and right to 'the companionship, care, custody, and management of
his or her children' is an important interest that 'undeniably warrants deference and,
absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection."') (quoting Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645,651 (1972)).
"See infra Section II.C.
74MichaelH., 491 U.S. at 147 n.5.
75Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 n.10 (1982) ("Nor is it clear that the State
constitutionally could terminate a parent's rights without showing parental unfitness."); cf.

Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) ("We have little doubt that the Due
Process Clause would be offended '[i]f a State were to attempt to force the breakup of
a natural family, over the objections of the parents and their children, without some
showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the
children's best interest."') ((citing Smith v. Organizationof FosterFamiliesfor Equal

& Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment)).
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as parents at all, thereby reducing the number of individuals whose
parental identity can only be terminated through an elaborate, potentially destructive hearing. This approach, endorsed in Justice
Scalia's opinion, best captures the import of the unwed father cases
leading up to MichaelH.
C. ConstitutionalProtectionfor the Child
There is one last aspect of Michael H. worthy of particular consideration before this Essay more directly addresses the claims of
nontraditional caregivers. Michael H. may be the only Supreme
Court case involving parental rights in which the child's interests
were independently represented. Victoria, Michael H.'s biological
daughter, was represented by a guardian ad litem who, consistent
with the recommendations of a court-appointed psychologist, determined that it was in Victoria's interest to maintain a relationship
with both father figures.76 Despite the independence of her claim
and its distinct psychological basis, the Court showed itself entirely
unable to conceive of Victoria's claim on its own terms. In the
three paragraphs of his opinion devoted to the question, Justice
Scalia concluded that "we find that, at best, [Victoria's] claim is the
obverse of Michael's and fails for the same reasons."' All other
opinions, concurring and dissenting, engage in no separate analysis
of Victoria's claim.
This avoidance of any distinct analysis of the claims of the individual most likely to be affected by the outcome of the litigation
seems as troubling in moral terms as it is understandable in pragmatic terms. Surely the law ought to be designed to account for
children's interests, but how this should be done is another question. If we are to recognize distinct constitutional rights in children
to develop and maintain relationships with adults, then we need a
method for balancing or prioritizing rights where the claims of the
multiple rights holders clash. Such multi-party balancing acts are
likely to leave the constitutional protection of some, and perhaps
all, with very little force. And even if we are to vest constitutional
rights in children in lieu of vesting any such relational claims in
"6Michael
H., 491 U.S. at 115.
'n Id. at 131.
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adults, then we need to worry about who is speaking for the child,
and on what basis that adult representative determines the child's
position.' Recognizing separate relational rights in children does
little to guarantee that their interests will be better served.
A better way of avoiding the moral peril of ignoring children's
interests while maintaining the simplicity necessary to secure constitutional protection of any force is to define the family around the
child and to refuse all adults any special constitutional status absent an undisputed claim to a parent-child relationship within that
family unit. As discussed, we have good reason to expect that children within an undisputed family unit will do best if most childrearing decisions are left to their parents. Where the identity of
those parents is in dispute, however, there will be no obvious best
surrogate decisionmaker among the adults. In such circumstances,
the state can play a unique role in sorting among contenders and
establishing that surrogate. As in the realm of private custody disputes between parents, assigning the state this decisionmaking
authority offers a good, if imperfect, means of securing a child's
healthy upbringing where real disputes over parental authority
threaten to undermine that upbringing.
In sum, the Court's parental rights doctrine, though not sharply
reasoned, reflects considerable wisdom about the relative strengths
of the family and the state in child rearing. Families, as the childspecific experts, can be expected to make better decisions for their
particular children than the state will make in all but the starkest
situations. The state, in contrast, has a special role to play in helping establish the authority of those child-specific experts in the face
of competitors. By affording parents in established families strong
constitutional protection for their child-rearing decisions while severely limiting an individual's right to claim parental identity
without regard to family structure, the Court's cases embrace a
scheme of constitutional interpretation that distributes authority in
a manner well-designed to serve children's interests. In keeping
with these interests, such a scheme gives states authority to recognize nontraditional caregivers as parents, but it prevents the state
78The case of Elian Gonzalez well illustrates the problems created when a rightsbearing child depends upon adults to assert those rights, and when the various

possible adult representatives do not agree about where the child's interests lie.
Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2000).
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from granting them parent-like privileges short of full parental
identity. The next Part applies this constitutional scheme to a range
of nontraditional claims.
IV. NONTRADITIONAL CAREGIVERS' PLACE UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION

There is considerable variety among nontraditional parental
claims, and the constitutional analysis varies with the claims. This
next section considers three types of claims that capture the primary constitutional issues: disputes between biological and adoptive
parents that arise near the time of birth, disputes among individuals who have collaborated to produce a child through artificially
assisted means, and disputes among various parental claimants later
in a child's life after parental identity has been firmly established.
In the first context, the Constitution should be read to afford the
state broad authority to assign parental identity to either the adoptive or biological parents, but, once it has done so, no authority to
compel ongoing visits with those not identified as parents. In the
context of assisted reproductive technology, the Constitution
should be read to prevent the state from intervening in private arrangements, so long as they remain amicable. Where disputes arise,
however, the state should be able to decide whether, and to what
extent, it wants to enforce those agreements. The hardest cases are
the proposed mid-life switches. Because the state threatens to take
away parental rights previously vested in the original parents, these
actions implicate both substantive and procedural due process protections. While these protections have appropriately been
interpreted to impose significant constraints on state attempts to
redefine parental identity, these constraints should be modestly relaxed where mid-life switches are initiated by private competitors
rather than the state.
A. Babies Jessica and Richard
The cases of Baby Jessica79 and Baby Richard' are the sort of
battles between biological and non-biological parents that produce

71In Interest of B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239 (Iowa 1992).
81Petition of Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324 (111. 1995).
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the greatest public outcry, and for good reason. In both cases the
child knew only one set of parents, the adoptive parents, with
whom the child had lived since birth. Despite this fact, Baby Jessica
at two-and-one-half years old, and Baby Richard at almost four
years old, were ordered to go live with their biological fathers,
whom the courts recognized as their sole legal parents. Over the
course of the litigation in these cases, the intended adoptive parents and the child advocates who supported them pressed for some
combination of parental rights, custody, or visitation, all in the
name of preserving the relationships these children had with their
adoptive families.81 Under the scheme advocated in this Essay,
however, the Constitutional implications of these various demands
are dramatically different. Under this scheme, the Constitution
would allow the state to declare the intended adoptive parents the
sole legal parents based on their established parental relationships
with the children, but if the state concluded that the parental identity belonged with the biological father, the Constitution would prevent
a court from ordering ongoing contact with the unsuccessful parental claimant.
What makes the Baby Jessica and Baby Richard cases difficult is
that both mothers employed deception to prevent the biological fathers from having the opportunity to oppose the children's adoptions.
In the case of Baby Jessica, the biological mother intentionally misidentified the father when she relinquished the baby for adoption.'
In the case of Baby Richard, the mother falsely told the biological
father that the baby had died, and the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that the adoptive parents had encouraged the deception.'
Were it not for the deception, both cases should have been easy
cases for the adoptive parents to win. State law routinely provides
only a small window of time for a biological father to block an
adoption to which the biological mother has already consented, assuming those fathers have been provided with reasonable notice.
But where a man is never informed (or has been misinformed)
about a child's conception, birth, or survival, it will strike many as
81

Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d at 326-27; B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d at 241.

SB.G.C., 496 N.W.2d at 241.
1 Kirchner, 649 N.E. 2d at 326-27. But see id. at 341-42 (Miller, J., dissenting)

(contending that the supreme court's conclusions about the adoptive parents' involvement in
the deception had not been established through proper evidentiary development).
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unfair to deny him a subsequent opportunity to assert his parental
fights. Even those who think the individual man's fights ought not
outweigh the child's interest in family stability might worry that
providing no protection to men in such circumstances will encourage women and adoptive parents to engage in such deception when
they wish to avoid involving the biological father in adoption decisionmaking.
A constitutional approach that gives no individual an automatic
fight to parental identity would allow the state to define even a deceived biological father as a non-parent. While a state's concern for
the incentive effects might lead it to refuse to enforce adoption arrangements produced through deceptive practices, the Constitution
should not be read to require this result, which would amount to
conferring parental identity fights on a set of individuals without
regard to family status. In contrast, allowing states to determine
whether these men ought to be identified as fathers is consistent
with an approach that limits parental identity fights to individuals
attached to an uncontested family unit. State adoption procedures
are designed to achieve clarity about who constitutes a child's family core as quickly as possible. A biological father, no matter how
well-intended, would have no constitutional claim where he had
failed to establish himself as part of the child's family core.'
Under this scheme, the Constitution should not be read to prevent the state from recognizing the adoptive parents as the children's
exclusive or additional legal parents, even where a biological parent neither agreed to the adoption, nor was given an opportunity to
object. But if a court decides, for whatever reason, that the child
should be raised by the biological parents, the state should have no
authority to qualify those parents' child-rearing fights by compelling ongoing visits or other sub-parental contact between the
former adoptive parents and the child against the biological parents' wishes. The ALI Principles, however, would produce
This theory suggests that the Illinois Supreme Court was wrong to conclude that
Baby Richard's biological father's due process rights were violated. See Kirchner,649
N.E.2d at 333 ("[F]athers such as Otto, whose parental rights are not properly
terminated and who, through deceit, are kept from assuming responsibility for and
developing a relationship with their children, are entitled to the same due process
rights as fathers who actually are given an opportunity and do develop this relationship.

To hold otherwise would be to encourage and reward deceit similar to that which
occurred in the instant case.").
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precisely the opposite effect. Under the Principles, the prospective
adoptive parents would have no authority to defeat the father's
claim of legal parenthood, but would clearly have authority as "de
facto" parents to seek some custodial and decisionmaking authority over the child, ranging from primary custodial authority to
much more minimal ongoing contact.
Stated more generally, the importance of a relationship between
a parent and child should bear on the state's determination of who
counts as a parent, but if not persuasive on that point, should not
be allowed potentially to undermine the parental relationship chosen in its stead. Indeed, it is in precisely those cases where the
relational claims of non-parents are the strongest that the disruption caused by compelling visits is likely to be greatest, and the
parents are likely to be least prepared to withstand the intrusion.
Where parental authority is most vulnerable to challenge, the designated parent will need the most help in establishing her legitimacy.
One way, of course, to establish that legitimacy is to facilitate
ongoing connections between her child and those with whom the
child has formed close relationships. If a parent does not see things
this way, however, compelling her cooperation will only further
undermine her effectiveness as the legally recognized parent.
B. Children Produced Through Assisted Reproductive Technology
Reproductive technology has produced an expanding number of
potential parental claimants including those who contribute genetic
material, those who contribute other biological material and processes,' and those responsible for planning and paying for the
conception and gestation of the child. These arrangements are generally developed through private agreement, and in the vast majority
of cases, these agreements produce clearly identified parents who
assume parental control over the children born without conflict.
But where conflicts do arise, either because the terms of the
15The most common arrangement involving a non-genetic biological contribution at
this point in the technology's development is the gestational surrogacy arrangement,
in which a woman carries a fetus conceived through the use of someone else's eggs.
Increasingly, however, physicians are experimenting with injecting an infertile
woman's genes into the healthy but geneless eggs of a donor, and additional uses of
non-genetic biological materials will likely be developed in the future. See Beating
Biology, Newsweek, Aug. 13,2001, at 45 (discussing this egg-fusing procedure).
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agreement were ambiguous or because the parties changed their
minds, disputants turn to the courts to resolve issues of parental
identity and related fights of contact with the child.
Under the constitutional scheme endorsed in this Essay, individual
choices, regardless of the parental configuration, would produce
parental fights absent dispute. This does not necessarily mean that
the state could not prohibit particular methods of assisted reproduction, but rather, that if a child was nevertheless produced by
such a method, the parents should still be those privately identified. Where disputes arise among private parties, however, the
state would have some authority to resolve them. At birth, this authority would be near absolute, whereas later in life the state's
authority to reallocate parental identity would become considerably qualified. To minimize the risk of future disputes, the law's
tolerance of a wide range of individually designed parenting arrangements should bring with it a commitment to ensuring that
parental identity is clearly assigned.
Even in the absence of disputes, these high-tech arrangements
press some constitutional questions about the scope of an individual's procreative rights. Do individuals have a right to procreate
through the use of reproductive technology, or can the state ban
certain technological means of reproduction altogether? Alternatively, can the state assign parental authority in a manner
inconsistent with that arranged by the parties? While the first question is not my focus here, I am inclined to think the Constitution
should be read to give the state authority to ban the use of certain
reproductive methods viewed as dangerous or inappropriate. But
whether or not the state has such authority, it should not be allowed to reassign parental identity, absent private dispute, where
the reproductive method in question actually produces a child.
While an argument could be made that the production of the child
introduces third-party effects that justify a compromise rather than
an expansion of an individual's liberty rights, the same concerns
about the state's relative incompetence and the threat of thirdparty harms associated with state intervention argue for private
control. Private arrangements reflect the commitment of individuals to undertake parental responsibilities and the terms under
which they are eager to do so. Second-guessing such decisionmak-
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ing threatens to undermine the satisfaction of those responsibilities
by introducing conflict and changing the terms.
So long as the private individuals involved cooperate successfully, the state should be required to accept the private individuals'
designation of parental figures, whether those figures include a
married heterosexual couple with no genetic relationship to the
child, or a lesbian couple, one genetically related to the child, one
not, and the sperm-contributing friend. The state can, however, require these figures to take some form of official action to identify
themselves (or disavow their identity) as the child's parents and
can establish default rules that determine who counts as a parent
where the parties fail to comply with these requirements. Such
identification requirements, paralleling the recording of information about maternal identity on birth certificates in the more
conventional context, make both clear and public who possesses
parental rights and, relatedly, ensure that all involved have come to
terms with the assignment of parental identity and the distribution
of authority that follows. Children can be expected to be wellserved by this combination of private choicemaking in the undertaking of parental responsibilities, and public identification of
where those responsibilities lie.
Where the private individuals disagree about this allocation of
responsibility, however, either because the terms of their agreement
are unclear or because they change their minds, they routinely turn
to the state to resolve the disagreement.' If the dispute arises
around the time of birth, the state could refuse to enforce the terms
of the contract without disturbing anyone's parental rights, for,
again, parental rights should not be tied to any individual's particular characteristics, whether biological or contractual. And, again,
this is because the Constitution will serve children best if it functions as a protector of private child-rearing choices against state
intervention, but not as an obstacle to state intervention aimed at
resolving private disputes that stand in the way of anyone's effective child rearing.
6 See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (conferring parental identity
on genetic parents against opposition of gestational surrogate); L.A.L. v. D.A.L., 714
So. 2d 595 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (barring sperm donor from establishing paternity
absent a court finding that the contract providing that he would have no parental
rights to.any offspring produced from that sperm was unenforceable).
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While we might generally object that holding private parties to
their previous contractual commitments protects private childrearing choices,' this objection frames the question in terms relevant to adults, but not to children. For children, the only commitments
and attitudes that matter are those adults hold at the time of actual
child rearing. Regardless of how harmonious an earlier plan to allocate child-rearing authority may have been, children's successful
child rearing will be threatened if that harmony has disappeared by
the time the child-rearing plan is to be executed. While children
are generally best served by leaving private individuals free to
make child-rearing decisions where their authority to do so is uncontested by competitors, they are not necessarily served by
continuing to defer to such arrangements once some of the contracting parties oppose the arrangement. Where the dispute arises
at birth, the state should be free to assign parental rights based on a
genetic, gestational, or contractual relationship, or on any other
grounds not otherwise constitutionally prohibited.
Of course, a state choice not to enforce such contracts would
likely discourage people from entering these contracts in the first
place.' Again, discouraging such arrangements might have implications for individuals' rights of procreation and body control, but
they implicate no parental identity rights, rights that only come
into play when there is a child in existence. For those considering
entering such an agreement, the promise or risk of non-enforcement
would encourage them to assess their degree of confidence that
other parties will voluntarily comply with the terms of the agreement. This assessment, in turn, is likely to serve children well.
All this is not meant as an argument against the enforceability of
these agreements, but rather as an argument against affording
these agreements any constitutional protection. The world of assisted reproductive technology is a brave new world in which everimproving techniques and ever-expanding contractual terms are
producing ever-changing issues of parental identity. 9 To protect
17See Richard Epstein, Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement, 81
Va. L. Rev. 2305 (1995).
Id. at 2339-40 (arguing that a failure to enforce surrogacy contracts fully will
reduce the number of parties willing to make surrogacy arrangements).
s9 In a recent case filed in California, for example, a dispute between a gestational
surrogate and the intended parents (the father of whom was genetically related to the
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children from the harms that can come with this level of change
and novelty, states should have the freedom to experiment with
different rules and to adapt those rules over time. In circumstances
where individuals create an undisputed family unit through the use
of assisted reproductive technology, the benefits of legal experimentation are predictably offset by the harms that come to
children when the state interjects conflict where conflict is otherwise absent. But where the arrangement dissolves in a dispute, we
should have no confidence about which constellation of parental
figures, or which means of resolving disputes, is best for children.
Where disputes among parties to these agreements arise later in
a child's life after some significant period of cooperation, the complexity of the constitutional issues depends upon what is being
disputed. Where the dispute is about who counts as a parent, the
Constitution imposes considerable procedural and substantive
brakes on the state's ability to reconfigure parental identity after it
has been firmly established elsewhere. The next Section takes up
these procedural and substantive limitations. But where the parties
all continue to adhere to their original arrangement as to parental
identity, but now dispute how custodial authority should be divided
among them,90 a state can intervene to allocate that authority, just
as it does in a more traditional two-parent custody split. In such
circumstances, the contractual terms governing parental identity
bind the court (assuming the parties have complied with state registration requirements), but any terms providing for visits or other
custodial rights of non-parents cannot be enforced against the par9
ents' wishes without violating those parents' constitutional rights. '
twin fetuses) over whether the surrogate was required to abort one of the twins at the
intended parents' request, raised the question of who, among the three involved
parties, had authority to approve the twins' adoption by others. See Tyche Hendricks
et al., More Than They Bargained For: Surrogate Mother Sues Berkeley Couple
After Refusing to Abort One of Their Twin Fetuses, S.F. Chron., Aug. 11, 2001, at
Al.
0 McDonald v. McDonald, 684 N.Y.S.2d 414 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998) (rejecting father's
attempt to gain custody of twin daughters based on his claim that ex-wife's deception
during infertility procedures demonstrated her unfitness as a custodian).
91In one case, an individual who had served as a co-parent but who lacked a genetic
relationship with that child agreed to relinquish any claim to parental status in
exchange for an agreement to ongoing visits. See, e.g,. Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d
959 (R.I. 2000). In another, a court ordered ongoing visits without clearly resolving
parental identity issues. V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000). Under the scheme
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As in more traditional custody disputes, courts could still order visits, but only among those identified as parents.'
C. Mid-Life ParentalSwitches
The most constitutionally complex cases are those in which a
dispute among parental claimants arises after a period when parental identity has been clearly established. In these cases, a child
classically lives with one or both biological parents for some period
of her life, but at some point, others assume much or all of the parents' child rearing responsibilities. This shift of child-rearing
responsibility might be initiated by an overwhelmed or uncommitted parent, by the concerned substitute caregiver, or by the state. It
might be intended as a temporary or permanent shift; it might occur all at once, or gradually over time. However the shift occurs, it
sometimes leads the substitute caregiver to seek recognition as a
parent in addition to, or in lieu of, the original parents. These are
the nontraditional cases the ALI seems most concerned about addressing in the Principles, and, perhaps, those that most constrained
the Court's exposition of parental rights in Troxel?
In all such cases, the Constitution limits the state's authority to
reassign parental identity against the original parents' wishes. In
these cases, unlike those discussed in the previous two Sections,
parental identity has been established, and even recognized by the
state, prior to the litigation contesting that identity. Any state
change or expansion of those with parental authority under these
circumstances will therefore deprive the previously identified parents of an important liberty interest protected in both substantive
and procedural terms by the Constitution.
These protections should, however, vary with the circumstances
of the shift. The most significant distinction in circumstances is between attempts to shift parental rights initiated by the state and
described in this Essay, the court would have no authority to compel visits under

either scenario.
92See, e.g., E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999) (finding that non-biologically
related lesbian partner qualified as parent, and ordering visitation accordingly).
93See, e.g., Troxel, 530 U.S. at 98 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("My principal concern is
that the holding seems to proceed from the assumption that the parent or parents who
resist visitation have always been the child's primary caregivers and that the third
parties who seek visitation have no legitimate and established relationship with the
child.").
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those initiated by other private parties. Where the state seeks to
terminate parental rights, it pits itself in the sort of direct contest
against the parent that justifies the highest degree of constitutional
protection. But where the state serves only as adjudicator of a contest pressed by a private competitor, the role the Constitution
should play in controlling that adjudication is somewhat less obvious. For the most part, nontraditional claims will be pressed by
nontraditional caregivers, and therefore fall into the second category. Before considering these hardest of cases, this Section considers
what we can learn from the state-initiated cases, whose constitutional
boundaries have already been explored by the Court.
1. Involuntary Termination of ParentalRights
In the classic involuntary termination case, the state petitions the
court to terminate parental rights and to bestow upon the state full
authority over a child. Such cases, then, present a version of the
classic state-parent contest, implicating constitutional protections
in their starkest terms. As in Stanley v. Illinois,94 the state seeks to
displace some private family unit with its own authority, but even
more troublesome than in Stanley, the state's attempt at displacement occurs after some period of state recognition of the family
unit in question. Where the state seeks to wrest parental authority
from an established familial core, the Constitution imposes formidable limits on those efforts. The parents' substantive due process
rights limit a state's grounds for termination to those of great weight
(classically parental "unfitness"), and their procedural due process
rights require that these grounds be particularly well-proved.
95 the Court reasserted
In Santosky v. Kramer,
the strength of
parents' constitutional protection against state intervention by
striking down a law that allowed a court to terminate parental
rights where parental unfitness was only proved by a "preponderance of the evidence." While some of the Court's analysis is
confused, its general approach is entirely in line with this Essay's
analysis.
In Santosky, the Court concluded not only that the parent's interest at stake was particularly strong, but that the state's parens
94 405 U.S. 645 (1972).

- 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
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patriae interest in the child's welfare fell, in most cases, on the
same side of the balance. Quoting Stanley, the Court explained that
"the state registers no gain toward its declared goals when it separates children from the custody of fit parents."' This analysis
reflects the child-focused justification behind affording parents
strong rights against state intervention, discussed above in Part II:
We can generally expect parents to be better than the state at
meeting their children's needs, and therefore should severely limit
the state's authority to intervene, even when it has some concern
about a parent's child-rearing practices. Only where the state can
prove that children will be seriously harmed by their parents' exercise of child-rearing authority should it be allowed to take that
authority away from them. While the substantive standard for termination was not at issue in Santosky, the Court's analysis
nevertheless endorsed a high, unfitness-based standard.
While parents' comparative advantage in child rearing supports
a high substantive standard for termination, it is not clear how it
bears on assigning a standard of proof. Where the high substantive
standard limits termination to those cases in which termination
would clearly serve a child's interests, a shift in standard of proof
will only increase the chance that those well-justified cases will go
unproved. The Court attempted to excuse this result by suggesting
that an erroneous failure to terminate parental rights would do far
less harm to a child than an erroneous termination would do for either parent or child,' but this aspect of the Court's reasoning is
unconvincing. While an adult individual certainly suffers a serious
loss when his parental rights are terminated, it is hardly obvious
that a child will suffer more from being separated from a fit parent
than from being left with one who is unfit."

Id. at 767 (quoting Stanley, 405 U.S. at 652).
Santosky, 455 U.S. at 765-66 (noting that "parents and the child share an interest
in avoiding erroneous termination," and that "[flor the child, the likely consequence
of an erroneous failure to terminate is preservation of an uneasy status quo," whereas
"[f]or the natural parents... the consequence of an erroneous termination is the
unnecessary destruction of their natural family.").
",The Court suggested that an erroneous failure to terminate parental rights would
have less serious consequences, because the child would likely remain in foster care
rather than being returned to her parents. But this argument fails to account for the
serious harm done to children who are left indefinitely in foster care. Moreover, the
Court's suggestion that the state can simply petition again, while legally correct is, in
17
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The Court suggested that raising the standard of proof would
have an error-reducing(as well as an error-shifting)effect, by righting a power imbalance between the state and parent in litigation.
The Court pointed to three types of advantages the state has over
parents in termination proceedings: its greater expertise and resources available to prove its case,' its ability to manipulate the
evidence by controlling the nature and extent of a parent's contact
with her children in foster care,"° and its ability to exploit the class
and race biases of the courts to the parent's disadvantage."' All
three of these factors, the Court noted, are likely to skew the
courts' decisions against the parents, producing erroneous findings
of parental unfitness. By forcing courts to be particularly confident
about their termination decisions, the Court argued, a higher standard of proof could reduce the overall error rate in these proceedings.
In Santosky, the Court appropriately relied on the Constitution
to allocate child-rearing authority toward the more competent parent and away from the more powerful state. The extent to which
this constitutional protection should change where the competition
is among private parties rather than between a unified private family and the state is the subject of the next Section.
2. PrivateBattles for ParentalAuthority
Where one set of caregivers goes to court to claim some or all
authority from a child's original set of parents, the state's role is
reduced to that of dispute resolver. Here too, the state threatens to
deprive a parent of his rights, but from a considerably more passive
position. In these cases, the presence of private competitors complicates the arguments of superior competence and inferior power
that justify strong constitutional protection in the state-initiated
cases. These complications, in turn, make it considerably more difpractice, unrealistic. When a state loses its attempt to terminate parental rights, it
rarely tries again.
19Santosky, 455 U.S. at 763 (pointing to the state's greater spending, legal expertise,
and access to psychological and medical experts as examples of the state's superior
"ability to assemble its case.").
'10Id. at 763 & n.13 (stating that "the State even has the power to shape the
historical events that form the basis for termination" by controlling visits, requiring
the parents to work with their choice of social workers, et cetera).
0' Id. at 763 ("Because parents subject to termination proceedings are often poor,
uneducated, or members of minority groups... such proceedings are often vulnerable
to judgments based on cultural or class bias.") (citation omitted).
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ficult to assess the connection between children's interests and parental rights. Focusing on this connection, I endorse a modest
diminution of the substantive and procedural protections afforded
original parents where the competing claimants are private individuals rather than the state.
Among those private claimants competing for legal recognition
as a child's parents, we cannot assume that the originally identified
parents will be the superior decisionmakers. Indeed, these disputes
often arise because someone close to the child concluded that the
original parents' child-rearing skills and commitment were seriously
inadequate. In addition, the intensity of the relationship formed
with and commitment shown to these children by some alternative
caregivers suggests that these caregivers will frequently possess the
same special qualifications to act on a child's behalf as more conventional parental figures are assumed to possess. But while the
assumptions about parents' superior competence are undermined
by the presence of committed competitors, the state's relative incompetence in assessing individual children's best interests still
cautions against affording states much authority to choose among
these competitors.
The difference between the state's near-absolute power to assign
original parental identity, on the one hand, and far more limited
power to shift parental identity once established, on the other, rests
on two important distinctions in the state's relative competence at
these two stages. First, the state's relative advantage is as representative of community views about what family configurations best
serve children in the aggregate. Its relative disadvantage, in contrast, is in assessing how any particular child will actually be best
served. It will do better, then, at resolving disputes among parental
claimants where not required to make a child-specific assessment
of the value of the various competing relationships in which a child
is already involved. Second, the state's intervention at the outset
offers the child a more unambiguous benefit: It resolves conflicts
early on, thereby freeing those identified as parents to begin exercising parental authority most effectively. In contrast, whatever
benefits a state offers a child in shifting parental authority from a
less to more competent caretaker will be at least somewhat offset
by the destabilizing effect of such a mid-life move. An approach
that gives the state near-absolute power to resolve conflicts in pa-
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rental identity at the outset, and only limited power to shift that
identity later in a child's life, well allocates decisionmaking to serve
the interests of children.
The Constitution's strong protection of parental rights thus sensibly extends to the parents' right to maintain parental identity,
once firmly established. The state's ability to shift or proliferate
that parental identity to another private claimant should, just as in
publicly initiated termination proceedings, therefore be limited to
those circumstances in which such a change is necessary to protect
a child from serious harm. How harm is measured, however, ought
to change in the context of these private disputes. In particular, a
court could properly reconfigure parental identity among private
disputants to protect a child from the harm associated with disrupting an important caregiving relationship, but could not approve a
state-requested termination on this basis. This is, again, because of
the power disparity between private parent and state, a disparity
that, as the Santosky Court pointed out, would allow the state to
manipulate the child's relationships to improve its case. Allowing
the state to rely on relational harms to justify termination would
encourage the state to nurture parent-child bonds in foster care
that would obstruct a parent's attempt to regain custody of her
child.
In contrast, private disputes are the result of relationships fostered, or at least tolerated, by the parents themselves.1" When
parents choose to involve others in the caregiving of their child, or
allow such involvement to continue when others step in, they are
choosing to blur the lines of the child's family core. Such a choice
will commonly serve the child's interests while maintaining the

19Note that voluntary foster care arrangements seem to represent a difficult case in
the middle. The coerced nature of many so-called "voluntary" foster care arrangements

counsels caution in equating such arrangements with the voluntary arrangements
reached informally with other individuals. See Robert H. Mnookin, Foster Care-In
Whose Best Interest?, 43 Harv. Educ. Rev. 599, 601 (1973) ("A substantial degree of

state coercion may be involved in many so-called voluntary placements, making the
distinction between voluntary and coercive placement illusory."). However, where
such arrangements could, in fact, be shown to be voluntary, and the development of

the foster family relationship not destructively manipulated by the state, the
Constitution should not be read to prevent the court from taking the relational harm

associated with a child's removal from foster care into account in determining
whether parental rights should be terminated.
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parents' ultimate authority over the family unit. But where collaboration ultimately breaks down, the court can appropriately
consider whether the harm caused by disrupting the nontraditional
parent-child relationship justifies a shift in parental authority.
Thus, a court could decide that a nontraditional caregiver was entitled to parental identity rights to the exclusion of a biological
parent, or that a divorced stepparent was entitled to parental rights
in addition to the biological mother and father.
We might well worry that courts will be too quick to find relational harm. Indeed, this inclination is precisely what makes the
ALI's expansion of custodial claimants so threatening. But, again,
this inclination can be dramatically checked by preventing the
court from allocating anything less than the full parental package.
A court cannot attempt to maintain a child's relationship with a
non-parent caregiver by awarding visits, for such an order constitutes a direct threat to the exercise of the undisputed parent's
authority. But if the relationship with the nontraditional caregiver
is strong enough to inspire that caregiver to seek legal authority to
take over as parent, the court can appropriately consider whether
denying the request will cause serious harm to the child. Barring
the court from distributing fragments of parental authority can be
expected to have a significant limiting effect on the nontraditional
caregiver's interest in litigation and the court's ultimate willingness
to intervene.
Children are likely to be better served, even in the context of
these private disputes, by limiting the courts' authority to reallocate parental rights to those cases where a failure to do so would
subject the children to serious harm. It is less clear, however, that
these children would be well-served by imposing on these private
disputants the same heightened standard of proof imposed on the
state in Santosky. The nontraditional caregivers have none of the
special litigation advantages of the state, nor can we expect the
court systematically to prefer their claims. 3 Indeed, in these cases,
control over the factual record is, to a large degree, in the hands of
the "defending" parents, who can control the extent to which any
individual develops a caregiving relationship with her child. Absent
103 As with all litigation, self-selection is likely to produce plaintiffs relatively wellprepared to litigate.
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proof of a particularly strong relationship between a nontraditional
caregiver and the child, a claimant has little chance of convincing a
court that a failure to shift parental authority will cause the child
serious harm.
CONCLUSION

Current attempts to protect nontraditional caregiving relationships, while well-intended, are poorly designed. They threaten to
undermine protections afforded parents by the Constitution that
serve children well. The mistake of these approaches begins with a
narrow view of parentage that leaves nontraditional caregivers outside the reach of constitutional protections. To afford them any
protection, the reasoning goes, the constitutional rights of parents
must necessarily be compromised. Instead, the Constitution should
be read to afford the state broad authority to recognize nontraditional caregivers as parents. Once parents are identified, however,
the Constitution affords them strong protection against state intervention, a protection well-designed to assist parents, however defined,
in the rearing of their children.
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